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Wendy Collins Perdue

The Story
Allocating
Authority Among

States

Shaffer v. Heitner 1 is one of a long series of Supreme Court cases
addressing the scope of state-court territorial authority. Indeed, Shaffer
is the first of a dozen modern cases that delineated the Court's current
conception of the constitutional limits on state-court jurisdictional authority.
Determining whether a court has jurisdiction to hear a dispute is an
important preliminary step in any litigation. But the constitutional
doctrine the Court has developed in this area is also an interesting
window on the Court's more general understanding of the allocation of
power among the states.

Social and Legal Background
The jurisdictional authority of a court is determined in the first
instance by the law of the sovereign that establishes the court. The
sovereign may choose to limit its courts' authority or it may take an
expansive approach. France, for example, has adopted an expansive
approach-French law gives French courts jurisdiction over all cases in
which the plaintiff is French, regardless of whether the defendant or the
events in question have any connection with France. 2 Jurisdictional
authority is also delineated in part by what other sovereigns are willing
to recognize. France may issue a judgment but if neither the defendant
nor the defendant's property is located in France, then a successful
1433 U.S. 186 (1977).
2

See Code civil art. 14 (Fr.).
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French plaintiff will have to rely on the willingness of other sovereigns
to enforce the judgment. If other sovereigns conclude that France has
exceeded the scope of its legitimate authority, they will not enforce the
judgment. Countries can, of course, enter into treaties whereby they
agree on the scope of their respective courts' jurisdiction and obligations
to enforce judgments, but, absent a treaty, the primary external limitation on one country's jurisdictional authority is the pragmatic concern of
whether other countries will enforce its judgments.

authority in the new
Amendment.

130

Within the United States, the states can also delineate the scope of
their courts' jurisdictional authority. However, unlike the relationship
among countries, the limits of jurisdictional authority (as well as the
obligation to enforce sister-state judgments) is ultimately controlled by
the U.S. Constitution. The foundational case that both solidified jurisdiction as a constitutional issue and delineated the framework for analyzing
this issue is Pennoyer v. Neff 3
That case involved a claim for nonpayment of fees brought by an
Oregon attorney against his former client, and the Court held that
Oregon lacked jurisdiction. According to the Court, there were only two
ways that Oregon could have gotten jurisdiction. First, if the defendant
had property in Oregon, that property could have been attached at the
outset of the litigation. This would have permitted a form of in rem
jurisdiction. Such jurisdiction is only "over the thing" and not over the
defendant, and is therefore limited to the value of the property. Second,
the other form of jurisdiction is jurisdiction in personam, or jurisdiction
"over the person." In personam jurisdiction potentially subjects a defendant to unlimited liability, but the Court held that it was available only
if this defendant had been served with process in the state, which had
not happened in Pennoyer.
The Court based its analysis on "two well established principles of
public law,'' that "every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory" and that "no State
can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or property
without its territory." 4 The result of Pennoyer was a relatively straightforward jurisdictional framework: in the absence of the defendant's
consent, states could constitutionally assert judicial jurisdiction only by
attaching property located in the state or by serving the defendant with
process in the state. The Court also introduced an important doctrinal
innovation-it grounded the limitations on state-court, jurisdictional
3 95 U.S. 714 (1878). For a fuller discussion of the facts of the case, see Wendy Collins
Perdue, Sin, Scandal, and Substantive Due Process: Personal Jurisdiction and Pennoyer
Reconsidered, 62 Wash. L. Rev. 479 (1987).
4

95 U.S. at 722.
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The realities of a modernizing society put increasing pressure on
this framework.. To begin, there was the problem of corporations. The
traditional rule had been that corporations exist only in their state of
incorporation and hence could only be served with process there. This
was not a problem so long as corporate enterprises were essentially local.
But with the growth of the interstate corporate enterprise, corporations
could inflict harm far from their state of incorporation. Yet the burden
remained on the victim to travel to the defendant in order to seek
redress. The courts responded not by changing the Pennoyer formulation, but by finding that corporations were "present" wherever they
conducted significant activities. 5 This judicial technique came under
increasing ridicule from legal realists. In the words of one commentator,
it was "transcendental nonsense" to try to determine where a corporation was "present" -corporations were not "things" and ought not be
analyzed as if they were. 6
Modern transportation added to the pressure on the Pennoyer approach. With the advent of the automobile, people could drive into a
state, cause harm, and leave. Once again, a victim who had never left
home could find himself or herself saddled with the burden of traveling
far from home to seek redress. States addressed this issue by passing
"consent" statutes under which people who drove into the state were
deemed to have implicitly consented to the appointment of a state official
to be their agent for service of process for any suit involving an
automobile accident. 7 Consistent with Pennoyer, that official could then
be served in-state-with notice of the suit mailed to the defendant at his
or her out-of-state home. Of course, this supposed "consent" was no
more real than the "presence" of an out-of-state corporation.
A final way that the courts dealt with the problems of distant
defendants was through in rem jurisdiction. Attaching the property of
out-of-state debtors was a technique that dated back to the seventeenth
century. 8 As noted earlier, in this country such jurisdiction was deemed
to be limited to the value of the property. However, even with this
limitation, it was a valuable device for asserting jurisdiction. When the
5 See Joseph J. Kalo, Jurisdiction as an Evolutionary Process: The Development of
Quasi In Rem and In Personam Jurisdiction, 1978 Duke L.J. 1147, 1176-80.

6 Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 Colum. L.
Rev. 809, 810 (1935).

ie

7 See

Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356 (1927).

s See Joseph J. Kalo, Jurisdiction as an Evolutionary Process: The Development of
Quasi In Rem and In Personam Jurisdiction, 1978 Duke L.J. 1147, 1161.

THE STORY OF SHAFFER

WENDY COLLINS PE

underlying lawsuit had nothing to do with the property, this technique
was called quasi in rem or "attachment jurisdiction"; when the dispute
concerned ownership of the property itself, as in a condemnation procedure, the technique was sometimes called a true in rem procedure.
Whether in rem or quasi in rem, Pennoyer had reinforced the validity of
attaching property as a basis for acquiring jurisdiction. In Harris v.
Balk, 9 the Court reaffirmed the validity of quasi in rem jurisdiction.
There the Court held that a plaintiff could assert jurisdiction by attaching the defendant's property held by another person in the forum state.
In Harris, the property that was attached was a debt owed to the
defendant, and the debt was attached by serving the defendant's debtor
while the debtor was passing through the forum state. Thus, the case not
only reaffirmed the continued validity of quasi in rem jurisdiction, but
also upheld it even as applied to intangible property.

Co., 13 suggested that
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emphasized that the
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In 1945, in the landmark decision of International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, the Court embarked on a new approach to analyzing
jurisdiction, at least with respect to in personam cases. The Court
rejected continued reliance on fictions such as "presence" for corporations, explaining that "the terms 'present' or 'presence' are used merely
to symbolize those activities of the corporation's agent within the state
which courts will deem to be sufficient to satisfy the demands of due
process." The Court then announced a new approach:
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a
judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of
the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice. " 10
But this new test for jurisdiction was remarkably vague. Indeed, Justice
Black in his concurrence expressed concern that the "elastic standards"
set forth by the majority might be used to deprive states of "the right to
afford judicial protection to its citizens on the ground that it would be
more 'convenient' for the corporation to be sued somewhere else." 11
During the 1950s the Court decided a series of cases that explored
the meaning of this test, but the holdings and language of these cases
left uncertainty. 12 Some cases, like McGee v. International Life Insurance
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10

11

Id. at 325 (Black, J., concurring).

See Philip Kurland, The Supreme Court, The Due Process Clause and the In
Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts, 25 U. Chi. L. Rev. 569, 593-623 (1958).
12
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Whatever the precise contours of the rule set out by International
Shoe, the holding of that case had undermined one of the core premises
of Pennoyer-that states could assert no direct jurisdiction over people
outside the state. Though it did not directly address the other premisethat "every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over
persons and property within its territory" -some commentators saw
that this principle was vulnerable as well. 15 In addition, courts and
commentators had begun to question the continuing coherence of the in
rem, quasi in rem, and in personam distinction. 16 ''The phrase 'judicial
jurisdiction over a thing,' is a customarily elliptical way of referring to
jurisdiction over the interests of a person in a thing," observed the
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. 17

International Shoe was not the only source of a potential due process
challenge to attachment jurisdiction. Beginning in 1969 with Sniadach v.
Family Finance Corp., 18 the Supreme Court decided a series of cases
concerning the right of a property owner to notice and hearing before his
or her property was attached. These cases recognized that prior notice
and hearing were not required in "exceptional situations" and suggested
that attachment for purposes of acquiring jurisdiction might be such an
exceptional situation. 19 Nonetheless, these references to attachment jurisdiction had been dicta, and the Court had not fully explored what the
contours of the exception might be. These two lines of due process case
law-the substantive International Shoe thread and the procedural Snia13

355 U.S. 220 (1957).

14

357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).

15 See, e.g., Albert A. Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The
"Power" Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65 Yale L.J. 289 (1956).
16 See, e.g., Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 312 (1950);
Philip Kurland, The Supreme Court, The Due Process Clause and the In Personam
Jurisdiction of State Courts, 25 U. Chi. L. Rev. 569, 617 (1958).
17

Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws§ 56 introductory note (1971).

18 395 U.S. 337 (1969); see Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Mitchell v. W.T.
Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974); N. Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601
(1975). This line of cases is discussed infra ch. 4: Robert G. Bone, The Story of Connecticut
v. Doehr: Balancing Costs and Benefits in Defining Procedural Rights.

19 See Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 339 (1969); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407
U.S. 67, 91 n.23 (1972); Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 679
(1974).
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Factual Background
The underlying facts of Shaffer date back at least twenty years
before the suit was filed. Between 194 7 and 1956, the Greyhound
Corporation, the largest bus company in the country, had acquired a
number of regional bus companies in the western United States. Mt.
Hood Stages, another regional carrier, had objected to several of these
acquisitions out of fear that Greyhound would use its new market power
to drive Mt. Hood out of business. In response to these objections and in
order to get approval from the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC)
for the acquisitions, Greyhound made representations and gave assurances that it would not discriminate against or otherwise disadvantage
Mt. Hood. By the mid-1960s it became clear that Mt. Hood's fears had
been well-founded. Although Greyhound brochures included information
about connections with other bus lines, they omitted references to Mt.
Hood. In addition, Greyhound changed some of its routes and schedules
so that transfers between Greyhound and Mt. Hood buses would be
inconvenient. Mt. Hood's ridership began to drop significantly.
In 1968, the ICC ordered Greyhound to cease and desist from
engaging in these practices. 20 That same year, Mt. Hood filed a civil
antitrust action against Greyhound. The year 1973 proved to be another
bad one for Greyhound. It lost the antitrust action by jury verdict, and
the court awarded Mt. Hood close to $15 million in damages and
attorneys' fees. 21 A month later, a different federal district court found
Greyhound (and its wholly owned California subsidiary, Greyhound
Lines, along with three of their officers, including R.F. Shaffer, Greyhound's president) guilty of both criminal and civil contempt of court for
violating the 1968 cease-and-desist order; the court then found that the
corporation had engaged in "willful and deliberate defiance" and assessed a fine of $600,000. 22
A corporation is a legal entity but can act only through its officers,
directors, and employees. The officers and directors of Greyhound had
20 In re Mt. Hood Stages, Inc., 104 M.C.C. 449 (1968), aff'd sub nom. Greyhound Lines,
Inc. v. United States, 308 F.Supp. 1033 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
21 The loss in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon was
eventually affirmed. Mt. Hood Stages, Inc. v. Greyhound Corp., 555'F.2d 687 (9th Cir.
1977), vacated, 437 U.S. 322, remanded, 583 F.2d 469 (9th Cir. 1978), re-entered, 1979 WL
1583 (D. Or. Jan. 26, 1979), aff'd, 616 F.2d 394 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 831 (1980).

United States v. Greyhound Corp., 363 F.Supp. 525 (N.D. Ill. 1973), enforced, 370
F.Supp. 881 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd, 508 F.2d 529 (7th Cir. 1974).

23

Telephone Intervie\

24

Telephone Intervie\

22

)TORY OF SHAFFER

r the constitutional

least twenty years
56, the Greyhound
try, had acquired a
United States. Mt.
l to several of these
.s new market power
~se objections and in
e Commission (ICC)
:ms and gave assurerwise disadvantage
H. Hood's fears had
ncluded information
~d references to Mt.
·outes and schedules
)Od buses would be
nificantly.
se and desist from
,. Hood filed a civil
)roved to be another
by jury verdict, and
m in damages and
district court found
>sidiary, Greyhound
R.F. Shaffer, Greyontempt of court for
then found that the
3 defiance" and as-

1

through its officers,
of Greyhound had

3

b nom. Greyhound Lines,

District of Oregon was
, 555 F.2d 687 (9th Cir.
'.J78), re-entered, 1979 WL
iied, 449 U.S. 831 (1980).
Ill. 1973), enforced, 370

WENDY COLLINS PERDUE

135

allowed the company to engage in a course of conduct with respect to Mt.
Hood that had cost the company over $15 million in damages and
penalties. The value of the company to its shareholders had thus been
diminished. In, theory, the corporation could bring suit against its own
officers and directors whose decisions had caused the company to have to
pay out these awards. However, since the decision to bring suit has to be
made by the officers and directors, it is not surprising they did not see fit
to bring suit on Greyhound's behalf against themselves.
In order to protect the interests of shareholders, the law provides an
alternative mechanism by which such suits can be initiated. Since it is
ultimately shareholders who suffer from a diminution in the assets of a
corporation, one or more shareholders can initiate a "shareholders'
derivative action" on behalf of the corporation. Any recovery in a
shareholders' derivative action goes to the corporation, not to the individual shareholder-plaintiff who initiated the suit. In such suits, the
corporation is a necessary party. Although the corporation is the intended beneficiary and therefore might be considered a plaintiff, it is joined
as a defendant because, having not initiated litigation in its own behalf,
it is usually not supportive of the plaintiff's claim.
Accordingly, Shaffer v. Heitner was a shareholders' derivative suit
brought on behalf of the Greyhound Corporation against the officers and
directors of Greyhound and its California subsidiary and against the two
corporations. The shareholder-plaintiff in Shaffer was Arnold Heitner, a
citizen of New York. Heitner's six-year-old son, Mark, had been given
one share of Greyhound stock when he was born, and Arnold was
custodian for his son. Arnold Heitner and his lawyer, Michael Maschio,
have different recollections of how Heitner came to be the plaintiff.
According to Heitner, a lawyer acquaintance had mentioned that another
lawyer was looking for someone who owned Greyhound stock and was
willing to be a plaintiff in a suit. 23 Arnold mentioned his son's one share
of stock and became the plaintiff. Maschio, on the other hand, recalled
that Heitner had previously been a client of the firm and that Heitner,
after reading about Greyhound and the contempt citation, initiated the
contact. Maschio was quite adamant that the firm had not sought out
Heitner or any other Greyhound stockholders. 24
To those who brought the suit, this undoubtedly looked like a
promising claim. Three Greyhound officers had been found guilty of
contempt of court, and the conduct that was the basis for that finding
was essentially the same conduct that resulted in the large antitrust
verdict. Although officers and directors are generally protected from
judicial second-guessing of their decisions by a doctrine known as the
23

Telephone Interview with Arnold Heitner (Aug. 1, 2003).

24

Telephone Interview with Michael Maschio (Oct. 13, 2003).

THE STORY OF SHAFFER

WENDY COLLINS P

business judgment rule, the rule might not protect willful and deliberate
conduct that was itself a violation of a court order.
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Prior Proceedings
Complaint. In May 1974, five months after the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois announced the
amount of the penalty for the criminal contempt, Heitner filed the
shareholders' derivative action in the Court of Chancery of Delaware
against twenty-eight present and former officers and directors of the
defendant Greyhound Corporation and of the defendant subsidiary corporation, Greyhound Lines. The Greyhound Corporation was incorporated in Delaware; at the time of the ICC order, its headquarters had been
located in Chicago (which is why the litigation about the cease-and-desist
order was in the Northern District of Illinois), but in 1971 it had moved
its headquarters to Phoenix, Arizona. Greyhound Lines was incorporated
in California with its headquarters in Phoenix. None of the officers and
directors named were citizens of Delaware.
The complaint described the contempt finding and the antitrust
verdict, along with the conduct of Greyhound that resulted in these
setbacks. It alleged that each of the individual defendants "engaged in or
acquiesced in the transactions referred to above and acted recklessly,
negligently and in disregard of his obligations as director or officer of
Greyhound." 25 It further alleged that the deferred compensation plan for
officers, directors, and employees of Greyhound was "excessive, unlawful, improvident and wasteful resulting in large damages to Greyhound
and its stockholders." 26 The complaint sought both unspecified damages
from the defendants and termination of payments to the defendants
under the deferred compensation plan.
Jurisdiction. Delaware law deems the stock of a Delaware corporation to be located in Delaware. 27 Under its so-called sequestration procedure, the stock is attached by delivering notice, usually accompanied by a
28
stop-transfer order, to the corporation's registered agent in Delaware.
The owner of the stock is sent a copy of the complaint and is offered the
choice either to enter an appearance thereby bestowing in personam
jurisdiction or to forfeit the stock.
The sequestration procedure had been available in Delaware since
1927. Although it was not limited to corporate cases, its primary use was
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willful and deliberate

for litigation involving officers and directors of Delaware corporations. 29
This use was an important one. Without some mechanism for assuring
that the directors of a corporation are subject to suit in one place, it
could be diffi~ult for a shareholder to enforce directors' obligations.
Outside directors might have no connection either with the state of
incorporation or with the headquarters state. Where the allegation is
that a board failed to take action, it might be particularly difficult to
determine where that failure to act occurred. Thus, there might be no
single place with which all the directors have contacts or connections. 30
Of course, the sequestration procedure was only available against those
officers and directors who owned stock, but this limitation had apparently not proved problematic.
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This unavailability of an alternative forum may have existed in
Shaffer. The individual defendants resided in nine different states. The
contempt finding was in Illinois but concerned conduct the effects of
which were primarily felt in Oregon. The record does not reflect where
the board of directors physically met for critical meetings or which
directors might have been present at those meetings. However, since the
basic allegation was that the board failed to take necessary compliance
steps, it would be difficult to determine where that failure to act
occurred. As noted earlier, Greyhound's headquarters moved from Chicago to Phoenix in 1971. Although the lack of an alternative forum might
have been an argument to support jurisdiction in Delaware, the plaintiffs lawyer never raised this argument. On the contrary, when asked at
oral argument in the U.S. Supreme Court whether an alternative forum
was available where all the parties could be joined, Maschio indicated
that "the wrongdoing took place probably-most probably out on the
coast" and that jurisdiction over the defendants in the place of the
wrongdoing was a "possibility." 31 At no time did he indicate that there
could be difficulties securing in personam jurisdiction outside Delaware,
nor was there any discussion of what the alternative forum might be for
challenging the lawfulness of the deferred compensation plan.
Regardless of whether an alternative forum was available in Shaffer
v. Heitner, the plaintiff's attorney decided to sue in Delaware by using its
sequestration provision. He followed all the necessary steps to sequester
the stock owned by most of the individual defendants, over $1 million in
value. In response, those defendants filed a motion to quash and vacate
29

See Hughes Tool Co. v. Fawcett Publ'ns, Inc., 290 A.2d 693, 695 (Del. Ch. 1972).

30 See Sue Ann Dillport, Jurisdiction over Nonresident Directors, Officers, and Shareholders: "Director" Consent Statutes After Shaffer v. Heitner, 32 Rutgers L. Rev. 255, 26263 (1979).

31

Transcript of Oral Argument at 27-28.
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the sequestration order. The stage was now set for this piece of corporate
litigation to become an important civil procedure case.
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32

State-Court Decisions. Both the Delaware Court of Chancery
and the Delaware Supreme Court33 rejected the defendants' challenge to
the sequestration statute. The opinions of these courts are revealing
because they highlight that the defendants did not raise a frontal assault
on quasi in rem jurisdiction. On the contrary, according to the Chancery
Court, the defendants "recogniz[ed] that a state can obtain jurisdiction
over nonresidents by an in rem attachment of their property within the
state,'' 34 but raised a number of issues concerning attachment under the
sequestration statute. These arguments, which are clearly s-et forth in
the opinion of the vice chancellor, were more narrow in scope than the
grounds that the U.S. Supreme Court would ultimately face in deciding
the case.
First, the defendants contended that the stock could not be attached
in Delaware because it was not actually located in Delaware. They noted
that Delaware was the only state that considered stock to be located in
the state of incorporation, whereas all the other states deem stock to be
located where the stock certificates are held. The vice chancellor rejected
this argument noting that a "shareholder owns a proportionate interest
in his corporation which is represented by a stock certificate," and that
sequestration "seeks to seize his ownership interest in the corporation,
not merely his documentary indicia of ownership." He further noted that
if the location of the certificate is treated as the critical situs, then "a
stockholder who lost his certificate could not have his stock interest
attached by any court, any where in the event he chose not to seek a new
one." 35
Second, the defendants argued that sequestration was an unconstitutional seizure of their property without prior notice and hearing. This
argument was the primary constitutional challenge both in the Delaware
courts and in the U.S. Supreme Court. Both Delaware courts rejected
this argument, noting that the U.S. Supreme Court had indicated that
attachment without prior notice and hearing was permissible in "extraordinary situations" and had specifically mentioned "attachment
necessary to secure jurisdiction in state court" as one of these extraordinary situations. 36 Indeed, in this context, several recent times the U.S.
32

Heitner v. Greyhound Corp., 1975 WL 417 (Del. Ch. May 12, 1975).

33

Greyhound Corp. v. Heitner, 361 A.2d 225 (Del. 1976).

34

1975 WL at *7.

35

36

37

256 U.S. 94 (1921).
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(1974).

39

361 A.2d at 229.

Id. at *3 [sic].

40

Transcript of Oral J

Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 91 n.23 (1972) .

41

Appellants' Reply B
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this piece of corporate
.se.

Supreme Court had cited with apparent approval Ownbey v. Morgan, 37
an older U.S. Supreme Court case that had upheld a Delaware statute
requiring a defendant to post bond in order to appear and defend an
attachment suit. 38
Third, th~ defendants asserted that this was not really a quasi in
rem proceeding because they were not given the opportunity to appear
and defend the property attached. Instead, the Delaware sequestration
procedure gave only the choice of submitting to in personam jurisdiction
or forfeiting the property. In rejecting this argument, both the Delaware
courts assumed that the state could constitutionally compel a defendant's appearance to the extent of the value of the property. The
analysis focused on whether the state could, in essence, leverage a valid
exercise of quasi in rem jurisdiction into in personam jurisdiction, and
both courts concluded that this was permissible.
Neither Delaware court devoted much of its analysis to International
Shoe and its significance. Indeed, the Delaware Supreme Court observed
that there were "significant constitutional questions at issue here but we
say at once that we do not deem the rule of International Shoe to be one
of them.' ' 39
U.S. Supreme Court. In the Supreme Court, the parties continued
to frame the issue narrowly. First, the primary focus of the briefs on the
merits and of the oral arguments was on whether a pre-attachment
notice and hearing were required. At oral argument, John Reese, arguing
for the appellants, did not even cite International Shoe. That case was
raised for the first time by one of the Justices late in Reese's argument. 40
Second, the personal jurisdiction argument that appellants did raise did
not make any broad attack on in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction. Reese
instead argued that in this case, the statute was used to coerce in
personam jurisdiction and that it should therefore be subject to the same
due process standard as any other exercise of in personam jurisdiction.
In other words, the defendants did not argue that actions in rem and
quasi in rem should be treated like actions in personam, only that "all
assertions of in personam jurisdiction, under any guise or label, are
subject to the same due process requirements." 41 Reese emphasized that
this statute resulted in defendants' being subject to in personam jurisdic-
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256 U.S. 94 (1921).

38 Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 339 (1969); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S.
67, 91 n.23 (1972); Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 679 n.13
(1974).
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361 A.2d at 229.
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Transcript of Oral Argument at 22.
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Appellants' Reply Brief on the Merits at 8.
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tion. "Today the issue is whether the Delaware sequestration statute can
constitutionally be applied to sequester the defendants' stock as a means
for coercing their general appearance in the action," he explained in his
opening statement to the Court. 42

the case by arguing
Hanson is said to a
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Heitner's brief similarly focused on whether pre-attachment notice
and hearing were required. His brief argued that attaching property for
the purpose of securing jurisdiction was an "extraordinary situation"
and hence pre-attachment notice and hearing were not required. 43 In
response to the argument that the sequestration statute improperly
coerced in personam jurisdiction, the appellee countered that the defendants had sufficient contacts to be subject to in personam jurisdiction
and noted that some states had enacted statutes that specifically conferred jurisdiction over out-of-state directors. 44 But this response created
something of a box for Heitner's lawyer, as one of the Justices pointed
out at the end of the argument. In explaining why there was no right to
pre-seizure notice and hearing, Heitner's lawyer had relied on the
language suggesting that attachment for the purpose of securing jurisdiction was an "extraordinary situation" that warranted an exception to
the notice and hearing requirements. However, if the defendants were
constitutionally subject to in personam jurisdiction, then there was no
"extraordinary situation," because all Delaware would have to do to
obtain jurisdiction was enact a long-arm or consent statute. 45
Interestingly, neither Heitner's brief nor Maschio's argument on
Heitner's behalf offered much of a defense of quasi in rem jurisdiction.
The brief does not even cite Harris v. Balk, which had upheld the use of
quasi in rem jurisdiction with respect to intangible property. Nor does it
rely on Ownbey v. Morgan. Indeed, at oral argument, Maschio conceded
that he did not think that Ownbey would be decided the same way
today. 46 According to Maschio, the decision not to defend quasi in rem
jurisdiction was a conscious strategy. 47 He explained that as soon as the
Court agreed to hear this case, he and the other lawyers in his firm
concluded that the Court did so in order to "overrule Pennoyer v. Neff."
Rather than weigh in on this issue, they thought it better to try to win
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Transcript of Oral Argument at 4-5.
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See Appellee's Answering Brief at 4.
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See id. at 13-14; Transcript of Oral Argument at 36-37, 4 7-48.
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Transcript of Oral A

45 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 49; see also Ernest Folk & Peter Morgan,
Sequestration in Delaware: A Constitutional Analysis, 73 Colum. L. Rev. 749, 766-67
(1973).
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Transcript of Oral Argument at 41.
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Telephone Interview with Michael Maschio (Oct. 13, 2003).
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Neither party raised or was prepared to address another critical
issue-whether the judgment of the Delaware Supreme Court was a
"final judgment." The Chancery Court had denied a motion to quash
and vacate the sequestration order. The Delaware Supreme Court had
affirmed the denial of the motion. Thus, there was no final judgment on
the merits of the case. However, the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a), requires a "[f]inal judgment[] or
decree[] rendered by the highest court of the State." Ordinarily, a final
judgment is one that "ends the litigation on the merits and leaves
nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment. " 49 Obviously, this
was not the case here. At the end of Maschio's presentation, the Court
raised this issue and then pursued it with Reese in his rebuttal. This was
an issue that neither Maschio nor Reese had considered. 50

The Supreme Court Decision
The Majority Opinion. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed. Unlike
the Delaware courts, the Supreme Court did see a serious constitutional
question with respect to International Shoe. "We think that the time is
ripe to consider whether the standard of fairness and substantial justice
set forth in International Shoe should be held to govern actions in rem
as well as in personam," wrote Justice Marshall for the Court. 51 The
Court concluded in the affirmative, and it held that Delaware's assertion
of jurisdiction violated that standard. It declined to decide whether preattachment notice and hearing were required.
Thus, the Court's opinion focused little on the arguments advanced
by the parties. Instead, the Court appears to have relied on the analysis
set forth in several lower court opinions. 52 William Schwarzer, who had
argued the case for the defendants in the Delaware Supreme Court,
observed that as he worked on the case, he "had no idea that the case
would result in the Court overruling Pennoyer v. Neff,'' and he charac48

Transcript of Oral Argument at 4 7.

49

Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945).

50 Transcript of Oral Argument at 50, 52.
51433 U.S. at 206. Note that the Court used "in rem" as shorthand for in rem and
quasi in rem. Id. at 199 n.17. Incidentally, Justice Marshall wrote for Chief Justice Burger
and Justices Stewart, White, Blackmun, and Powell. Justice Rehnquist did not participate.
52 See U.S. Indus., Inc. v. Gregg, 540 F.2d 142 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 908
(1977); Jonnet v. Dollar Sav. Bank, 530 F.2d 1123, 1130-43 (3d Cir. 1976) (Gibbons, J.,
concurring).
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terized the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion as an example of "the Court
running away with the case." 53
The Court first addressed the issue of its own appellate jurisdiction
in a footnote and held that the Delaware decision was a final judgment
within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a). The Court explained that the
decision was " 'not subject to further review in the state courts' " and
that although the defendants might ultimately prevail on the merits
following a trial, " 'there should be no trial at all.' " The Court stressed
that its conclusion was "'consistent with the pragmatic approach that
we have followed in the past in determining finality.' " 54
The Court then turned to a historical survey of personal jurisdiction
doctrine from Pennoyer through International Shoe and its progeny.
Noting that suits "against" property are really suits against the owner,
the Court asserted that "Fourteenth Amendment rights cannot depend
on the classification of an action as in rem or in personam." The Court
next, in Part III of its opinion, considered and rejected several arguments in favor of retaining the traditional rule with respect to the
presence of property-that it facilitates enforcement of judgments, that
it provides jurisdictional certainty, and that it is constitutional because it
has been historically accepted. After rejecting all of these arguments, the
Court concluded that "all assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be
evaluated according to the standards set forth in International Shoe and
its progeny." Notwithstanding this language, the Court did not prohibit
the use of in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction. Moreover, the Court
suggested that when "claims to the property itself are the source of the
underlying controversy ... , it would be unusual for the State where the
property is located not to have jurisdiction." 55 But in this case, attachment jurisdiction was not reasonable.
In Part IV, the final section of the opinion, the Court applied the
"standards set forth in International Shoe" to the facts of Shaffer
considered as an in personam case. The Court concluded that the officers
and directors of this Delaware corporation had insufficient contacts with
Delaware to be subject to personal jurisdiction in Delaware. The Court
stressed that there was no allegation that the defendants had "ever set
foot in Delaware," 56 a type of physical contact that International Shoe

and its progeny seem
The Court also disc01
over officers and dire,
Delaware had not er
Court did not explain
was not sufficient to
responded to Heitner'
benefits to the officen
was therefore fair to e
accused of abusing th
simply established tha
was fair to litigate in
directors could be st
reflected in Delaware'
Delaware's judicial m
observed, it is as if tl
with where he will be l

142

Telephone Interview with William W Schwarzer, Senior United States District Judge
for the Northern District of California (Oct. 27, 2003). Schwarzer had planned to argue the
case in the U.S. Supreme Court, but was appointed to the federal bench before he could do
so.
'
54 433 U.S. at 195 n.12 (quoting Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 485-86
53

(1975)).
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mmple of "the Court

and its progeny seemed to disavow as a necessary condition for power. 57
The Court also discounted Delaware's interest in asserting jurisdiction
over officers and directors of Delaware corporations on the ground that
Delaware had not enacted legislation designed for this purpose. The
Court did not explain why the decision of the Delaware Supreme Court
was not sufficient to establish Delaware's interest. Finally, the Court
responded to Heitner' s argument that Delaware law provides substantial
benefits to the officers and directors of Delaware corporations and that it
was therefore fair to expect them to answer in Delaware when they were
accused of abusing their power. According to the Court, this argument
simply established that it was fair to apply Delaware law, but not that it
was fair to litigate in Delaware. The Court never explained why if these
directors could be subjected to the sovereign power of Delaware as
reflected in Delaware's substantive law, they could not be subjected to
Delaware's judicial authority. As Professor Silberman has memorably
observed, it is as if the Court thought "an accused is more concerned
with where he will be hanged than whether." 58
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The Court had been divided on whether to reach the issue of Part
IV. There was no factual record concerning the defendants' contacts with
Delaware, although Heitner had argued that the defendants had sufficient contacts by virtue of being officers and directors of a Delaware
corporation. At Justice Brennan's request, Justice Marshall circulated an
alternative draft in which the Court simply ordered a remand. While
Justices Brennan and Stewart favored a remand, 59 the rest of the Court
preferred to reach this issue. Justice Powell in a memo to Justice
Marshall offered his rationale:
I agree with Byron [White] that the issue of minimum contacts was
addressed by the parties and the entire thrust of your opinion-as I
read it-supports the view that fairness requires more than the
minimal contacts present in this case. In short, I would reverse.
There is also a "make weight" reason that supports reversal.
This has all the earmarks of a lawyer-made case. There are thousands of shares of Greyhound stock outstanding. Only one share57 See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); cf Burger King Corp.
v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985) (upholding jurisdiction despite fact that defendant had
never visited the state).
58 Linda J. Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner; The End of an Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 33, 88
(1978).

59 See Letter of Justice William Brennan to Justice Thurgood Marshall, May 18, 1977;
Letter from Justice Potter Stewart to Justice Thurgood Marshall, May 18, 1977. All of the
letters between the Justices cited herein are from the Thurgood Marshall papers in the
Library of Congress, and they appear on the website collecting materials related to this
book.
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holder, owning one share . . . , instituted and is pressing this
expensive litigation. While a single shareholder has standing to
maintain a derivative shareholder suit, there are lawyers who make
a plush living using tame clients who acquire one share of stock in
numerous corporations for the purpose of setting the stage for
"strike" suits. The objective usually is to force a settlement and
claim a generous fee to be paid by court order often from corporate
funds.
Even if this is not such an "arranged" litigation, fairness to the
defendants-who already must have been put to considerable expense by the holder of a single share [one share of Greyhound
common was quoted Friday on the NYSE at $14.25; the high for the
year to date is less than $16.00]-suggests that we dispose of the
case here on the basis of your opinion. 60
The Separate Opinions. Although Justice Powell was in agreement with the analysis in Part IV, he had some reservations about the
discussion of in rem jurisdiction, and he and Justice Stevens wrote
separate concurrences. Justice Powell concurred in the majority opinion,
while Justice Stevens concurred only in the judgment. Both concurrences
expressed complete support for the holding that "the principles of
International Shoe Co. v. Washington should be extended to govern
assertions of in rem as well as in personam jurisdiction in a state
court." 61 However, they both also suggested that ownership of certain
kinds of property located in a state "may, without more, provide the
contacts necessary to subject a defendant to jurisdiction within the State
to the extent of the value of the property." 62 Justice Stevens argued that
the presence of property in the state is sufficient for jurisdiction; Justice
Powell suggested that the Court should at least reserve the question.
Their opinions highlight an important ambiguity in the majority opinion.
Although the majority opinion stated that the "standards" of International Shoe apply in all cases, the Court never explicitly held that those
standards would be applied in the same way to an in rem case as they
would to an in personam case.
In a typical in rem or quasi in rem case, unlike an in personam case,
the judgment is limited to the value of the property. 63 This is not a mere
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60 Letter from Justice Lewis Powell, Jr., to Justice Thurgood Marshall, May 31, 1977;
see Richard A. Matasar, Teaching Ethics in Civil Procedure Courses, 39 J. Legal Educ. 587,
603-05 (1989).

61433 U.S. at 217 (Powell, J., concurring) (citation omitted); see id. at 217 (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
62

Id. at 217 (Powell, J., concurring); see id. at 218 (Stevens, J., concurring).

63

Of course, the Delaware sequestration statute was not, as a practical matter, so

limited, because the defendant was required either to enter a general appearance or forfeit
the property.

64

Id. at 218 (Stevens, J
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formal difference; it is a difference that has serious, real-life consequences. It therefore might be a difference that matters in assessing
what is "fair." Also, as Justice Stevens observed, "If I visit another
State, or acquire real estate or open a bank account in it, I knowingly
assume some risk that the State will exercise its power over my property
or my person while there." 64 The majority never clearly weighed in on
this important point. Its opinion acknowledged that an in rem or quasi
in rem judgment is limited to the value of the property, but asserted that
the "fairness of subjecting a defendant to state-court jurisdiction does
not depend on the size of the claim being litigated." 65 This was, of
course, not entirely responsive to Justice Stevens' point. His point was
not that small claims are entitled to small protection but that whatever
the value of one's property, when one knowingly locates one's property
in a state, one creates an affiliation with that state that might make
jurisdiction fair.
Justice Brennan filed a dissent. He too agreed that all jurisdiction
should be evaluated under the standards of International Shoe, but he
argued that in applying those standards, it was fair to subject the officers
and directors of Delaware corporations to jurisdiction in Delaware for
suits growing out of their fiduciary duties. He stressed Delaware's strong
interest in the litigation and argued that the same factors that make it
appropriate to apply Delaware law to such disputes also made it appropriate to give Delaware's courts jurisdiction. Finally, he dismissed as
irrelevant the fact that Delaware lacked a statute targeting directors of
Delaware corporations. "I cannot understand how the existence of minimum contacts in a constitutional sense is at all affected by Delaware's
failure statutorily to express an interest in controlling corporate fiduciaries," he observed. 66
The Perfect Storm. Shaffer v. Heitner was a "perfect storm" with
respect to quasi in rem jurisdiction. Not only did it involve intangible
property, but also Delaware used a different situs for that property than
did every other state. It was not even a traditional application of quasi in
rem because the defendants were not permitted to enter a limited
appearance; instead, the property was being used to extort in personam
jurisdiction. The plaintiff argued that there were sufficient contacts for
in personam jurisdiction, but this argument further complicated the
issue of the need for notice and hearing before attachment; the justification for the attachment was the need to get jurisdiction, but if there
were sufficient contacts for in personam jurisdiction, there did not seem
to be much need for the attachment. Finally, the case was a sharehold64

Id. at 218 (Stevens, J., concurring).

65

Id. at 207 n.23; see also id. at 209 n.32.

66

Id. at 226 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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ers' derivative action brought by a single shareholder. It is interesting to
speculate whether the opinion would have been written differently if the
property attached had been in-state tangible property, if the state had
allowed a limited appearance, or if the case had involved a tort injuring a
local plaintiff in the forum state who could not get in personam jurisdiction because the defendant did not have purposeful contacts with the
forum state.
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Likewise, one might wonder whether the opinion might have been
written differently if the case had been argued with a more spirited
defense of quasi in rem jurisdiction. It is worth remembering, however,
that Heitner's goal was to allow this case to proceed in Delaware. He had
no interest in a more nuanced examination of quasi in rem jurisdiction
unless that resulted in a win. According to Maschio, he did not argue for
a remand because he did not want one. 67 A shareholders' derivative suit
is a complex and expensive type of litigation. Maschio and the other
lawyers in his firm did not want to return to the Delaware courts for
more procedural wrangling over jurisdiction. They preferred either to
win with certainty that they could proceed or to cut their losses by an
end to the litigation. The defendants' lawyer, on the other hand, indicated that a remand was one of the things that most worried him, because
he thought it likely that Delaware would uphold jurisdiction. 68 Since the
plaintiff did not argue for a remand, this was not an issue that the
defendants' lawyers ever had to address directly.

The Immediate Impact of Shaffer
As a result of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision, the shareholders'
derivative suit brought by Heitner in Delaware was dismissed and never
refiled.
A mere thirteen days after Shaffer was handed down, Delaware
signed into law a new director-consent statute. 69 That statute provided
that henceforth by being a director of a Delaware corporation, a director
consents to be sued in Delaware in any suit against the corporation in
which he is a necessary party or in any suit alleging violation of his duty
as a director. The synopsis of the law explained that:
Delaware has a substantial interest in defining, regulating and
enforcing the fiduciary obligations which directors of Delaware corporations owe to such corporations and shareholders who elected
67

Telephone Interview with Michael Maschio (Oct. 13, 2003).

68

Telephone Interview with John Reese (Oct. 28, 2003).

69 Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 3114 (signed July 7, 1977, and amended as of Jan. 1, 2004,
to cover officers as well).
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them. In promoting that interest it is essential that Delaware afford
a convenient and available forum for supervising the affairs of
Delaware corporations and the conduct of directors of Delaware
corporatiqns. 70
The legislative history does not reveal why Delaware responded so
quickly. Edmund Carpenter, who represented the defendants in the
Delaware Chancery Court, offered a theory. 71 He explained that the
sequestration statute was very popular with the Delaware bar, presumably because it increased the pool of cases in Delaware for which
Delaware lawyers could provide representation. Indeed, he mused that
he was probably not very popular among his colleagues for having raised
his challenge to the statute. He speculated that the bar followed Shaffer
very closely and had probably been thinking of a response in the event
the U.S. Supreme Court decided as it did. In any event, the constitutionality of this statute was later upheld by the Delaware Supreme Court. 72
International Shoe had disavowed reliance on "fictions of implied consent," but it would appear that such fictions remain useful.
The Greyhound Corporation responded to this change in Delaware
law by moving its state of incorporation to Arizona. Greyhound's management explained that "it would be an unreasonable burden upon
directors not resident in Delaware, several of whom reside in Arizona
and California, to be required to journey to Delaware to defend a case
there when they have no contact with that state." 73
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The Continuing Importance of Shaffer Today
Shaffer marked the beginning of a period of intense exploration by
the U.S. Supreme Court of the limits on state jurisdictional authority.
Prior to Shaffer, it had been nearly twenty years since the Court had
decided a significant jurisdiction case, that being Hanson. In just under
thirteen years following Shaffer, the Court would decide another eleven
cases. 74 Those cases fleshed out the theory implicit in Shaffer.
70 Synopsis, Del. Sen. Bill No. 341 (1977), quoted in Sue Ann Dillport, Jurisdiction over
Nonresident Directors, Officers, and Shareholders: "Director" Consent Statutes After Shaffer v. Heitner, 32 Rutgers L. Rev. 255, 267 n.75 (1979).
71

Telephone Interview with Edmund Carpenter, II (Oct. 20, 2003).

72 Armstrong v. Pomerance, 423 A.2d 174 (Del. 1980); see In re Mid-Atlantic Toyota
Antitrust Litig., 525 F.Supp. 1265, 1271 CD. Md. 1981) (upholding similar statute in
another state); Stearn v. Malloy, 89 F.R.D. 421, 424 (E.D. Wis. 1981) (same).
73 Quoted in David L. Ratner & Donald E. Schwartz, The Impact of Shaffer v. Heitner
on the Substantive Law of Corporations, 45 Brook. L. Rev. 641, 653-54 (1979).

ended as of Jan. 1, 2004,

74 See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990); Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v.
Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985);
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Shaffer also marked the Court's endorsement of Hanson's emphasis
for personal jurisdiction on purposeful availment by the defendant,
rather than McGee's focus on reasonableness that would include the
interests of the plaintiff and the state in assuring a remedy. In holding
that Delaware lacked jurisdiction over the officers and directors of a
Delaware corporation sued for breach of their fiduciary obligations in
violation of Delaware law, the Court stressed that the defendants never
"purposefully avail[ed themselves] of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State." 75 Subsequent cases would reiterate this
language and build on the requirement of "purposeful availment" by the
defendant. 76
Although Shaffer is significant for its endorsement of the purposeful-availment test, the Court's actual application of that test to the facts
of Shaffer has not proved influential. Eight years after Shaffer, in Burger
King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 77 the Court upheld personal jurisdiction in a
situation that had many similarities with Shaffer. Justice Brennan, who
had dissented from Part IV of Shaffer, wrote Burger King and made no
effort to distinguish Shaffer; instead, he just ignored it. Burger King
involved a suit by a huge Florida-based franchisor against its Michigan
franchisee. The Court upheld Florida jurisdiction over the Michigan
franchisee although there was no evidence that the defendant had "ever
set foot" in Florida. The Court stressed that the franchisee had entered
into a long-term contractual relationship with the Florida company and
derived benefits from that relationship. One might have said the same
about the directors in Shaffer. The Burger King Court also thought it
significant that the franchise contract included a choice-of-law clause
selecting Florida law. Again, one might have said the same about the
application of Delaware law in Shaffer. Of course, there are differences
between Shaffer and Burger King. What is striking, however, is that
even though the lower court had relied in part on Shaffer to dismiss, 78
the Burger King majority did not feel the need to distinguish Shaffer,
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984); Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984); Keeton v.
Hustler Magazine, 465 U.S. 770 (1984); Insurance Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites
de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (1982); Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980); World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84
(1978).
433 U.S. at 216 (quoting, with brackets, Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253
(1958)).
75

76 See, e.g., Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980); World-Wide Volkswagen v. Wood'
son, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
77

471 U.S. 462 (1985).

78 Burger King Corp. v. MacShara, 724 F.2d 1505, 1509 (11th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 471
U.S. 462 (1985).
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and even the dissenters in Burger King did not rely on Shaffer as a basis
for their conclusion against jurisdiction. Today, Part IV is primarily cited
to uphold jurisdiction over corporate directors based on state consent
statutes. 79 Bey~nd this, it is largely ignored.
Likewise, the impact of the opinion's Part III on attachment jurisdiction remains uncertain. Several states, including notably New York,
continue to exercise quasi in rem jurisdiction, attaching bank accounts
as the basis for jurisdiction. 80 These states in essence rely on the theory
suggested by the Powell and Stevens concurrences. Moreover, Congress
has turned to in rem jurisdiction as a technique to secure jurisdiction in
certain Internet cases. The Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act
of 1999 provides that if an Internet domain name violates the rights of a
registered trademark and if the trademark owner is not able to obtain in
personam jurisdiction over the offending domain name owner, the trademark owner may bring an in rem action against the domain name. 81 For
purposes of such an action, the "situs" of the domain name is deemed to
be the place where the domain name "registrar, registry, or other
domain name authority" is located. In upholding the constitutionality of
the statute, a district court in Virginia has explained, "under Shaffer,
there must be minimum contacts to support personal jurisdiction only in
those in rem proceedings where the underlying cause of action is
unrelated to the property which is located in the forum state. Here the
property, that is, the domain name, is not only related to the cause of
action but is its entire subject matter." 82 Other courts and commentators
have questioned this interpretation of Shaffer. 83 Eventually, the Supreme
Court may need to reenter this arena and clarify the law.
Even aspects of Shaffer's core analysis with respect to attachment
jurisdiction have been called into question by Burnham v. Superior
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79 See, e.g., In re Mid-Atlantic Toyota Antitrust Litig., 525 F.Supp. 1265, 1271 (D. Md.
1981); Stearn v. Malloy, 89 F.R.D. 421, 424 (E.D. Wis. 1981).

so See Michael B. Mushlin, The New Quasi In Rem Jurisdiction: New York's Revival of
a Doctrine Whose Time Has Passed, 55 Brook. L. Rev. 1059, 1089-99 (1990); Holly Haskew,
Shaffer, Burnham, and New York's Continuing Use of QIR-2 Jurisdiction: A Resurrection
of the Power Theory, 45 Emory L.J. 239, 258-66 (1996).
s115 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A).
82 Caesars World, Inc. v. Caesars-Palace.com, 112 F.Supp.2d 502, 504 (E.D. Va. 2000).
The court also rejected the argument that a domain name registration is not a proper kind
of thing to serve as a res: "There is no prohibition on a legislative body making something
property. Even if a domain name is no more than data, Congress can make data property
and assign its place of registration as its situs." Id.

83 See, e.g, FleetBoston Financial Corp. v. FleetBostonFinancial.com, 138 F.Supp.2d
121 (D. Mass. 2001); Catherine T. Struve & R. Polk Wagner, Realspace Sovereigns in
Cyberspace: Problems with the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 17 Berkeley
Tech. L.J. 989, 1006-18 (2002).

150

THE STORY OF SHAFFER

Court, 84 the last of the Supreme Court's set of jurisdiction cases. Burnham involved jurisdiction based solely on the transient presence of the
defendant who was served with process while in the forum state. Many
observers and a few lower courts had concluded that after Shaffer such
"tag" jurisdiction was unconstitutional. 85 They reasoned that Shaffer
had cracked the remaining bedrock principle of Pennoyer-that "every
State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and
property within its territory." 86 Shaffer had undermined the "property"
portion of this principle, and therefore the "persons" portion seemed
equally vulnerable.
The predictions proved wrong. In Burnham, the Court unanimously,
though without a majority opinion, upheld the constitutionality of tag
jurisdiction. Justice Scalia, writing for at most a plurality, offered a
narrow reading of Shaffer. According to him, Shaffer simply dealt with
suits "against" property. International Shoe dealt with suits against
people, but that case had explicitly stated that its "fair play and
substantial justice" analysis applied only where the defendant "be not
present within the territory of the forum." 87 Thus, neither Shaffer nor
International Shoe had anything to say about situations in which the
defendant was physically present within the forum state. After reviewing
the historical record, Justice Scalia concluded that tag jurisdiction was
considered acceptable at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment and that therefore it could not violate the Due Process
Clause.
Justice Scalia admitted that the broader approach of the Shaffer
Court presented something of a problem for his analysis. Shaffer had
conducted an independent inquiry into the desirability and fairness of
attachment jurisdiction, explaining that " 'traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice' can be as readily offended by the perpetuation of
ancient forms that are no longer justified as by the adoption of new
procedures that are inconsistent with the basic values of our constitutional heritage." 88 Justice Scalia has repeatedly rejected this type of
84

495 U.S. 604 (1990).

85 See, e.g., Harold M. Pitman Co. v. Typecraft Software Ltd., 626 F.Supp. 305, 312
(N.D. Ill. 1986); Hans Smit, The Implications of Shaffer v. Heitner: Seminal or Minimal, 45
Brook. L. Rev. 519, 523 (1979); David Vernon, Single-Factor Bases of In Personam
Jurisdiction-A Speculation on the Impact of Shaffer v. Heitner, 1978 Wash. U. L.Q. 273,
303; Jack Friedenthal, A Comment on the Impact of Shaffer v. Heitner in the Classroom,
1978 Wash. U. L.Q. 319, 320.
86

95 U.S. at 722.

87

326 U.S. at 316.

ss 433 U.S. at 212.
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open-ended fairness analysis of the Due Process Clause, 89 calling it
"imperious": "'Due process' ... does not mean that process which
shifting majorities of this Court feel to be 'due,' " he argued in Burnham.90 He reconciled the approach in Shaffer with his historical approach
by observing 'that perhaps Shaffer's approach "can be sustained when
the 'perpetuation of ancient forms' is engaged in by only a very small
minority of the States" and by noting that Delaware was alone in
treating the state of incorporation as the situs of stock. 91 Thus, Justice
Scalia's opinion suggests that Shaffer should be read narrowly to apply
only to cases involving "intangible property that has no reasonable
nexus with the forum." 92 Interestingly, Justice Scalia has continued to
suggest that Shaffer should be read narrowly, if not outright overruled,
arguing that the case, "at least in [its] broad pronouncements if not with
respect to the particular provisions at issue, [was] wrongly decided" and
that because the Shaffer "rationale has no basis in constitutional text
and itself contradicts opinions never explicitly overruled [it] has no valid
stare decisis claim upon me. " 93
In some respects, the aspect of Shaffer that was most influential in
shaping the future of jurisdiction law is the issue that neither party even
noticed-whether the state-court determination was immediately appealable. Over the next few years, many of the Court's most important
jurisdiction decisions would arise on appeals from state courts that had
upheld jurisdiction but where no final judgment on the merits had been
entered. 94 Interestingly, eleven years after Shaffer, in Van Cauwenberghe
u. Biard, 95 the Supreme Court would undermine this aspect of Shaffer,
suggesting that a decision upholding jurisdiction is not a final judgment
at least for purposes of reviewing federal-court decisions pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1291. However, by then the Court had decided most of its
significant jurisdiction cases.
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Conclusion
Notwithstanding the erosion of the applicational aspects of its
holding, Shaffer remains a staple of first-year civil procedure courses
89

See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).

90

495 U.S. at 627 n.5.

91

Id. at 622.

Russell Weintraub, An Objective Basis for Rejecting Transient Jurisdiction, 22
Rutgers L.J. 611, 623 (1991).
92

93

Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 36, 38 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).

94 See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990); Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v.
Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987); Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984); Rush v.
Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980); World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980);
Kulka v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978).

95

486 U.S. 517, 525 (1988).
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because it laid the important theoretical foundation for the Court's
subsequent jurisdiction cases. Justice Stewart had predicted as much. A
month before the case was handed down, Justice Stewart commended
Justice Marshall on his draft opinion, writing:
This seems to me one of the most interesting cases we have had
here in a long time. I think you have written an excellent opinion,
and if, as I hope, it becomes the opinion of the Court, it will surely
be immortalized as required reading for every first year law student
in the country for years to come. 96

I

Similarly, Justice Powell called Justice Marshall's opinion "a 'must' for
the textbooks. " 97
Shaffer-and indeed the entire set of Supreme Court cases on
territorial jurisdiction-will likely retain their preeminence as part of the
first-year curriculum in law schools. The reason is that jurisdiction is a
topic that implicates both the identity of states as sovereigns and also
the core questions about when governments can legitimately exercise
power over individuals. As one commentator has observed, "Jurisdiction
is power." 98 Shaffer u. Heitner helps establish the modern framework for
analyzing when that power can reasonably be exercised.
96

Letter from Justice Potter Stewart to Justice Thurgood Marshall, May 18, 1977.

97

Letter from Justice Lewis Powell, Jr., to Justice Thurgood Marshall, May 31, 1977.

98 Donald Werner, Dropping the Other Shoe: Shaffer v. Heitner and the Demise of
Presence-Oriented Jurisdiction, 45 Brook. L. Rev. 565, 568 (1979).
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